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Freyer, Tony Allan The Passenger Cases and the Commerce Clause:
Immigrants, Blacks, and States' Rights in Antebellum America. University Press
of Kansas, $39.95 ISBN 9780700620081
Competing State and Federal Jurisdictions in the Antebellum South
In this study of the Passenger Cases (1848-1849), Tony Freyer has written a
long-needed work of a poorly understood set of Supreme Court decisions from
the antebellum period, suits that reveal much about growing sectional tensions
prior to the Civil War. The cases are framed both in their own time and
bracketed by related information from earlier and later periods: Freyer fully
contextualizes the lawsuits, as well as describes earlier Marshall era cases to
show how prior decisions like Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) and Brown v. Maryland
(1827) might have influenced the Court’s decisions. He then moves well beyond
the Civil War in the last two chapters of the book to bring the importance of the
Passenger Cases forward to the present day, for example discussing them in light
of the anti-immigrant cases from Arizona and Alabama heard by the high court
since 2010. As such, this book covers an amazing amount of ground in only 169
pages (plus chronology and index).
The Passenger Cases offered the Supreme Court the opportunity to weigh in
on the proper division of power between states and the national government
when it came to the admission or potential exclusion of immigrants from ports
like New York City and Boston. Could a state require a ship captain to hand in
documents about his passengers’ conditions? Could it tax the ships in which
immigrants arrived, to provide funds that would run a hospital for those who
came to America in need of medical care? Could aliens who arrived be taxed,
without exception, to support a state’s poor relief funds? Most importantly, did
such regulations run afoul of the national government’s constitutional power to
regulate commerce? The states of Massachusetts and New York each passed
legislation to place these sorts of burdens upon arriving immigrants and the
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captains who transported them. The money raised subsidized the growing costs
associated with rising numbers of immigrants who arrived but were indigent,
sickly, or both—and the funds collected grew enormous in a time when the
potato famine of Ireland drove ever more desperate individuals into the coffin
ships sailing for America. Know-Nothing supporters had no interest in these new
arrivals, and favored heightened regulations if it would turn back would-be
immigrants. Simultaneously, those ships delivered more men inclined to join the
ranks of the Democratic Party in cities where politics thrived on corruption.
These issues of political power, immigration, and discrimination (ethnic,
religious, and racial) were entangled with constitutional issues of balancing
power between the state and the nation. Freyer’s book reveals that, despite
Justice Scalia’s claim in Arizona v. U.S. (2012) that states had traditionally had
greater authority to exclude immigrants and that the federal commerce clause
permitted this, in fact the Supreme Court had ruled to the contrary when given
earlier opportunities like the Passenger Cases. In the Passenger Cases, the court
ruled 5-4 that federal power under the commerce clause gave the national
government, not states, the ability to regulate aliens aboard inbound ships (in
future, states would have to come up with alternate methods to fund their
almshouses). This was a position the Marshall Court had avoided in earlier suits,
preferring to create a distinction between commerce and persons, a distinction
that did not survive the Passenger Cases—no matter how much Chief Justice
Taney might have hoped such a distinction would prevail in the court’s decision
(this time, Taney was outvoted).
The potential to conflate commerce with persons lay at the heart of Southern
nervousness about the Passenger Cases. If the Supreme Court should determine
that the federal government had sole authority to regulate interstate commerce as
it affected persons—in this case, immigrants—and then later deemed slaves to be
legal persons, the court might thereby give Congress the power to put the
internal slave trade completely out of business. Although some white
Southerners mourned the closure of the international slave trade in 1808, the end
of direct importation of Africans had been accomplished by a specific element of
the Constitution, not by interpretation of the commerce clause. Expansion of the
clause’s power could give abolitionists a powerful tool to use against slavery.
Moreover, if the national government’s commerce clause power could trump all
state-based laws that regulated the arrival or departure of individuals, Southern
laws that imprisoned free black sailors during their stays in Southern ports might
likewise be swept away. Thus, suits that potentially expanded commerce clause
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powers garnered high levels of attention in this period; any cases the Supreme
Court heard in relation to the commerce clause and individuals aboard ships (like
the Passenger Cases) were bound to be incendiary, as far as the “peculiar
institution" was concerned.
This book is smartly structured, giving the reader ample information on
parallel cases in New York and Massachusetts, tracking their progress through
lower courts, describing the key players in full (judges, lawyers, activists,
politicians), and offering extensive quotes drawn from the primary sources that
Freyer has obviously plumbed to the depths. This is, however, one element that
may give readers some pause: the University Press of Kansas has published the
book in its Landmark Law Cases and American Society series, which prints
books without footnotes. Instead of footnotes, the reader is given a bibliographic
essay offering pointers to where further information may be found; the essay
itself is loaded with good scholarship, but locating individual quoted material
using it might be close to impossible.
From a less eminent scholar, this missing apparatus might potentially
compromise the book’s credibility and utility. It is here that knowledge of Tony
Freyer’s earlier scholarship comes in handy. Freyer has spent a lifetime writing
well-crafted legal histories that tackle tough questions. The author of ten books
and numerous articles, Freyer has established himself as an expert on the
intersection between federalism, business, and the commerce clause—the
territory staked out in this book on the Passenger Cases.
Though novices on the commerce clause may find the concepts grappled
with in this text challenging, graduate students studying slavery and those
educated in legal controversies from this era will find much in Freyer’s new
work to applaud, and learn from. The book deserves to find a broad audience,
not just among historians, however. Our understanding of where the federal
commerce clause ends and state police powers begins is not merely a question of
historical interest; its impact upon questions of current day policy regarding
immigration continue to give it immediacy and relevance.
Sally E. Hadden is an associate professor of history at Western Michigan
University. She is the author of Slave Patrols and co-editor of A Companion to
American Legal History (with Al Brophy) and Signposts: New Directions in
Southern Legal History (with Patricia Minter).
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